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Interpersonal Affect, Accountability and Experience in  
Auditor Fraud Risk Judgments and the Processing of Fraud Cues 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines whether auditors’ affect toward client management influences fraud 
likelihood judgments and whether accountability and experience with fraud risk judgments 
moderate this effect. This research also explores the process by which affect influences fraud 
judgments by examining affect’s influence on the evaluation of fraud evidence cues. Results 
indicate that more positive affect toward the client results in lower fraud likelihood judgments. 
Accountability is found to moderate this effect, but only for experienced auditors. These findings 
have implications for fraud brainstorming sessions where all staff levels provide input into fraud 
risk assessments and because client characteristics are especially salient during these 
assessments. Importantly, results also support the proposition that affect impacts inexperienced 
auditors’ fraud assessments through errant attribution of client likeability to evidence cues that 
refer to management, rather than biasing all client-related evaluations. Together, these findings 
suggest that education and training can be improved to better differentiate relevant and irrelevant 
cues in fraud judgment.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“One cannot be introduced to a person without experiencing some 
immediate feeling of attraction or repulsion and without gauging such 
feelings on the part of the other. We evaluate each other constantly, we 
evaluate each others’ behavior, and we evaluate the motives and the 
consequences of their behavior” Zajonc (1980, p. 153). 
 
One of the cornerstones of the audit profession is the objective evaluation of evidence 
(Kinney 1999). A critical source of audit evidence comes from the interactions between auditors 
and their clients (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board [PCAOB] 2004). As discussed 
by Bennett and Hatfield (2013), characteristics of the audit work environment, including client 
management, have the potential to affect auditor behavior. Individuals have an automatic, 
emotional evaluation of others, which has been shown to influence one’s interpretation of 
subsequent facts and impressions (Regan et al. 1974, Fiske and Taylor 1991). Research has 
shown that interpersonal affect influences financial decisions (Kida, Moreno, and Smith 2001, 
Moreno, Kida and Smith 2002), juror judgments (Kadous 2001), and auditor judgments 
(Bhattacharjee and Moreno 2002, Bhattacharjee et al. 2012). Reviews of the auditing literature 
note the dearth of research on how interpersonal relationships influence audit judgments (Nelson 
and Tan 2005) and call for research examining the effect of task experience and/or other 
interventions that may serve to minimize the effects of affect on auditor judgments 
(Bhattacharjee and Moreno 2013). Further, there is little research on how affect may affect fraud 
judgments even though client characteristics may be more salient in a fraud setting.  
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether interpersonal affect (client likeability) 
impacts auditors’ assessments of fraud risk. Further, this study extends prior research by 
examining two potential moderating factors, accountability and experience, which have been 
shown to eliminate certain judgment biases (Kennedy 1993, Bhattacharjee and Moreno 2002). 
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Importantly, the professional standards require inclusion of inexperienced auditors in fraud 
brainstorming discussions (AICPA 2002b). These professionals may be the most susceptible to 
client affect (Bhattacharjee and Moreno 2002), and they tend to have significant interactions with 
clients (Bennett and Hatfield 2013). However, even those with general audit experience may not 
have experience in assessing fraud risk. As discussed by Hammersley (2011), task experience 
may be more useful than general audit experience in explaining effectiveness on fraud tasks. 
Therefore, this study specifically examines the moderating influence of task experience 
(experience with fraud risk assessments) on fraud risk judgments. Further, within the fraud risk 
setting, interpersonal affect may be more salient since client factors (i.e. attitudes, honesty, 
competence) need to be attended to in assessing management characteristics. Accountability is 
particularly important in this case as it enables auditors to evaluate information more 
systematically to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant information. Finally, this study 
explores the process by which interpersonal affect impacts fraud judgments by examining how 
client likeability influences the assessment of specific fraud evidence cues.  
 An experiment in which client likeability and accountability were manipulated was 
conducted with professional auditors as participants. A self-report measure of direct fraud risk 
experience was also collected. Auditors judged the likelihood of fraud for a company and then 
assessed the extent to which ten evidence statements were indicative of fraud. Results indicate 
that client likeability impacts overall fraud likelihood judgments with auditors assessing a higher 
(lower) likelihood of fraud for dislikeable (likeable) clients. A three-way interaction indicates 
that accountability mitigates this effect for the auditors who have relevant task experience. 
Further, the paper finds differences in the manner in which experienced versus inexperienced 
auditors assess independent fraud cue statements. Inexperienced auditors make errant attributions 
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of likeability to the fraud cue statements that reflect management characteristics and attitudes, 
while experienced auditors exhibit no affect bias in their assessments of the fraud cue statements.  
This paper contributes to both practice and academia by providing a first step to 
identifying the boundary conditions of the combination of experience and accountability on fraud 
judgments. These findings provide support for the profession’s use of accountability tools 
(requiring documentation/justification) to encourage effortful thought, but highlight the need for 
task-specific knowledge in fraud judgments. Brainstorming and group discussions of fraud can 
provide a venue for experiential training for inexperienced auditors to learn to distinguish 
relevant from irrelevant information in their judgment process.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section of the paper presents 
the theory and hypotheses. The third section describes the experimental design. Finally, the last 
two sections present the results and conclusions, and offer some directions for future research.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Evidence received from the client may be one of the most pervasive (Koonce 1992) and 
cost-effective types of audit evidence (Wright and Mock (1985)). While evidence collected from 
independent sources is considered more reliable, personnel within the client organization possess 
valuable knowledge (Haynes 1999). In some instances, such as assessing client integrity and 
competence, management may be the only practical source of evidence (Anderson and Marchant 
1989; Anderson, Koonce and Marchant 1994). The auditing standards require auditors to conduct 
interviews with client personnel pertaining to potential fraudulent activity, but they also require 
the auditor to maintain professional skepticism “regardless of any past experience with the entity 
and regardless of the auditor’s belief about management’s honesty and integrity” (AICPA 
2002b). Thus, both academic research and the professional literature recognize the importance of 
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the auditor-client relationship and its influence on evidence evaluation, evidence reliability, and 
professional skepticism.  
Auditing research has investigated several characteristics of client personnel that are 
relevant to auditing judgments, including competence (Hirst 1994; Bhattacharjee et al. 2012), 
source reliability (Anderson et al. 1994), and “tone at the top” (Marden, Holstrom, and Schneider 
1997). In the discussion of their results, Anderson et al. (1994) suggest that the social context of 
the audit environment may contain some dimensions not captured in their experiment. The 
auditor-client social context is an important aspect that has been largely neglected by research 
(Waller 1989). Hoffman and Patton (1997) suggest the social interaction is immediate as auditors 
begin forming impressions of the client during initial meetings. The auditors surveyed by 
Gibbins and Wolf (1982) consistently rated client service matters and people involved in the 
audit as important environmental factors for the auditor to consider. In fact, of the thirteen most 
important factors identified, five were directly related to the social environment of the audit, 
including references to personnel (client and auditor), client service, and client wishes. The 
professional standards implicitly acknowledge this social context by cautioning the auditor to 
maintain professional skepticism in client interactions despite any previous experience with the 
client (AICPA 2002b). While some client characteristics (integrity, trust, competence) are 
relevant to auditing judgments, client likeability (disposition) is an irrelevant factor for fraud 
judgment.  
Research finds that auditors do include some evidence that is not relevant in their 
judgments, and that experience may moderate this effect. Hackenbrack (1992) provided auditor 
participants with both evidence relevant to the experimental judgment and evidence relevant to 
other aspects of the audit but not the judgment task. Hackenbrack suggests that auditors may 
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include irrelevant information in judgments due to “similarity based inference processing.” 
Similarity based inferences are based on evidence that is similar but not a substitute for relevant 
evidence in a judgment.1. Hoffman and Patton (1997) argue that the professional guidance omits 
the important hazard of auditors attending to irrelevant evidence in fraud judgments. The 
discussion of professional skepticism in the standards suggests that client likeability (disposition) 
should not be mistaken as a relevant cue, such as client integrity, in a fraud judgment. While a 
few accounting studies have examined the impact of face-to-face human (affective) interaction in 
audit judgments (i.e. Bhattacharjee and Moreno 2002; Bhattacharjee et al. 2012), researchers 
note the importance of, and need for, future research in this area (i.e. Nelson and Tan 2005; 
Bhattacharjee and Moreno 2013). Further, fraud provides an important setting for the 
examination of the influence of affect. Interpersonal affect cues may be more salient in this 
environment as auditors assess management characteristics and attitudes in order to detect fraud 
red flags.   
Affect 
 
The affective evaluation of others is automatic and immediate (Zajonc 1980). That is, 
people immediately feel attraction or avoidance toward others. One way this affective evaluation 
can impact future judgments is through errant attribution (e.g., Regan, Straus and Fazio 1974). 
Attribution relates to the mental processes employed in a particular judgment used to draw causal 
inferences (Fiske and Taylor 1991). For example, Regan et al. (1974) demonstrate that a simple 
manipulation of likeability toward a target person in the introduction of a videotaped skill-test 
impacts the overall skill rating of the target person. That is, a likeable (dislikeable) person will 
receive higher (lower) skill rating despite demonstrating equivalent skill on a task. Specifically, 
                                                 
1 The term “similarity based inference” is consistent with judgment errors described as errant attribution. While 
attribution is looking for a cause on an event (Hastie 1984), errant attribution is errantly attributing someone’s 
behavior to disposition qualities rather than the appropriate factor (Fiske and Taylor 1991). 
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the performance of a liked (disliked) target was attributed to the target’s ability when the 
performance was good (bad), but attributed to external situational factors when the performance 
was bad (good)2. Thus, auditors should be aware that client likeability established in an initial 
client meeting may impact future judgments related to the client attributes, such as competence 
and integrity, causing suboptimal fraud judgments.  
Affect in Accounting 
 
While accounting research finds that auditors develop an attitude toward evidence, which 
may include an affective component (e.g., Bamber, Ramsay and Tubbs 1997), relatively little 
research has specifically investigated affect in the judgments of accountants. Kida and Smith 
(1995), Kida, Moreno, and Smith (2001), Bhattacharjee and Moreno (2002), and Bhattacharjee et 
al. (2012) are some notable exceptions.  
Kida and Smith (1995) provide a theoretical model of cognitive processing that includes 
affect, which was supported empirically in a study by Kida, Smith and Maletta (1998). Kida, 
Moreno, and Smith (2001) examine the systematic impact of affect on accountants’ capital 
budgeting decisions. Business managers reject capital budgeting projects that elicit negative 
affect even though they have higher expected returns. This demonstrates that business managers 
do not make judgments in a strictly rational economic manner. Instead, they include in their 
judgment a cost or avoidance utility function associated with the negative affect of persons 
related to the judgment. 
Bhattacharjee and Moreno (2002) find that staff and seniors rate inventory obsolescence 
risk assessments higher when they have negative affect toward the client than when no affective 
                                                 
2 The experimental task was to assess the skill of a student performing a skill test. Participants viewed a two-part 
videotape including an introduction (likeability manipulation) and the target student performing the test. The current 
research follows the Regan et al. (1974) protocol and is discussed further in the method section below.  
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information is provided. Conversely, affect does not influence the judgments of managers and 
partners. Their findings support the hypothesis that general audit experience may limit the impact 
of negative affect toward a client during an audit judgment task. Bhattacharjee, Moreno and 
Riley (2012) extend this research by examining whether affect influences auditors’ sensitivity to 
client competence. They find that when client competence is low, auditors rate the risk of 
obsolescence higher for dislikeable clients than likeable clients. However, the effect is eliminated 
for high competence clients.  
The current study extends the literature on affect toward the client to a fraud judgment 
task. Fraud provides an important and distinct setting for the examination of the influence of 
affect. Fraud continues to be a concern to the auditing profession with large resources being 
devoted to litigation (See Hammersley 2011). Auditors must attend to specific client 
characteristics as they assess fraud risk in their communications with management in order to 
evaluate the client’s attitudes and assess whether the client may be concealing information. 
These interpersonal interactions are potentially more susceptible to the influence of affect than 
other general audit tasks. Auditing standards note the importance of fraud judgments and specify 
that fraud discussions should continue throughout the audit (AICPA 2002, SAS 99). Although 
client likeability should not be considered relevant evidence in fraud judgments, we expect that 
since prior research has shown that affect toward the client has erroneously been included in 
other accounting judgments, it will also be included in fraud judgments. On the other hand, since 
fraud has serious implications for an audit client, it is possible that auditors use more systematic 
(versus heuristic) thinking and are thus better able to exclude irrelevant information. Stated as a 
testable hypothesis: 
H1:  Positive (negative) affect toward a client will result in a lower (higher) overall 
likelihood judgment of fraud. 
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Accountability and Experience as Moderators 
 Bhattacharjee and Moreno (2013) call for the examination of factors that may moderate 
the impact of client likeability. This study examines accountability and fraud risk assessment 
experience as potential moderating factors. Accountability has been shown to influence what 
evidence the judge attends to and how that evidence is weighted (Tetlock 1992; Hirst 1992; 
Messier and Quilliam 1992; Peecher 1996; Hoffman and Patton 1997). In practice, auditors are 
held accountable to superiors, and are generally required to explain their judgments through 
workpaper documentation.  
The framework for accountability’s debiasing effect is that judges have available two 
mental processes: heuristic/low effort (system 1 thinking) and systematic/high effort (system 2 
thinking) to evaluate judgment criteria. High effort judges pay closer attention to the message 
cues rather than environmental cues such as the person sending the message (Chaiken 1980). The 
high accountable judge is motivated to balance efficient and effective processing based on the 
audience preferences and demands (Fiske and Taylor 1991; Tetlock 1992). In this study we posit 
that greater accountability will cause more effortful thinking, which will enable individuals to 
exclude the irrelevant environmental cues (client affect) from their decision. An explicit 
justification requirement is a common and salient accountability manipulation (e.g. DeZoort, 
Harrison, and Taylor 2006; Agoglia, Kida, & Hanno, 2003) that has been shown to lead to more 
complex and careful analysis of information. To vary accountability, participants in the high 
(low) accountability condition will be informed of an explanation requirement for their judgment 
before viewing the case materials (at the time of recording their judgment). Pre-knowledge of the 
explanation requirement should lead to more effortful analysis of information (process 
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accountability), whereas asking for an explanation at the time of the judgment should result in 
lower accountability (outcome accountability). Formally stated: 
H2: As accountability increases, the impact of affect toward the client on the overall 
likelihood of fraud judgment will be reduced. 
 
Accountability has been shown to reduce effort-related biases such as primacy (Tetlock 
1983) and recency (Kennedy 1993) for individuals with relevant experience. Conversely for 
those with less experience, accountability has been shown to exacerbate certain judgment biases 
or result in less extreme judgments when the judgment environment includes irrelevant evidence 
(Nisbett, Zukier and Lemley 1981; Tetlock and Boettger 1989; Hackenbrack 1992; Kennedy 
1995; Shelton 1999). Because accountability may induce effort-based thinking where knowledge 
and experience are essential, this study also considers the auditor’s task experience. Knowledge 
gained from experience can create knowledge structures that differentiate experienced auditors 
from novices (Frederick 1991). Prior accounting research has considered differences in novices 
and experienced professionals in making audit judgments (Bonner and Lewis 1990; Libby and 
Frederick 1990; Bonner and Pennington 1991; Libby and Tan 1994; Bonner 1990; Shelton 1999; 
Bhattacharjee and Moreno 2002). Shelton (1999) finds that auditors with less experience include 
irrelevant evidence in a going concern judgment, but experienced audit partners do not use 
irrelevant audit evidence in the going concern judgment. Similarly, Davis (1996) finds that more 
experienced audit seniors attend to more relevant information than inexperienced audit seniors in 
a control risk assessment task. In addition, he reports that the experiential knowledge of audit 
seniors leads them to view fewer pieces of evidence, and make judgments in less time. 
Specifically related to affect, Bhattacharjee and Moreno (2002) find that general audit experience 
moderates the influence of affect on auditors’ risk assessments of inventory obsolescence. 
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Auditor experience can be general or task-specific. While general audit experience is 
relevant in many audit judgments, Hammersley (2011) points out that it is a noisy proxy for 
fraud experience given the high variance of field experience with actual fraud among auditors. 
That is, general audit experience does not ensure that an auditor has gained experiential fraud 
knowledge. Thus, she suggests that fraud experience is a more useful measure for explaining 
performance on fraud tasks. Hammersley further discusses the importance of measuring 
experience with financial reporting fraud specifically. However, she notes two studies that find 
the typical auditor has less than one encounter with financial reporting fraud. Since the setting in 
the current study is a fraud risk assessment in the client acceptance/planning stage, the 
experience measure chosen is a self report of whether the auditor has been “directly involved in 
judging the likelihood that a firm may have material fraudulent financial reporting”.3 Although 
lower ranking audit staff may have little experience in directly assessing fraud risk, they are an 
important part of the fraud risk assessment process. SAS 99 requires audit teams to conduct 
brainstorming sessions during the audit planning stage related to fraud, and all levels of 
experience (rank and task experience) are expected to provide input. Thus in a fraud risk task, it 
is important and relevant to determine whether experience has an effect on whether auditors are 
susceptible to affect biases. 
This research specifically examines the influence of task-specific-knowledge gained 
through experience (Bonner 1990). Because auditors that have experience in direct assessment of 
fraud risk have developed stronger knowledge structures of the fraud risk they are more apt to 
select authoritative cues and objectively weight cues leading to a reduced impact of affect. 
                                                 
3 Participants were asked a debriefing question of “What proportion of these firms did have a material irregularity 
(fraud in their financial statements)?” Consistent with other studies, partners with over 20 years of experience 
reported encountering 0-2 actual material fraudulent misstatements. 
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Therefore, it is expected that auditors who have fraud risk assessment experience will be less 
likely to include client likeability in a fraud judgment. Formally stated: 
H3:  Fraud risk assessment experience will mitigate the impact of client affect on the 
overall likelihood of fraud judgment. 
 
Affect and Evidence Evaluation 
A second focus of this paper is to explore the process by which affect toward the client 
impacts fraud likelihood judgments. Client likeability could impact the overall judgment directly, 
or it may impact fraud judgments indirectly through the auditor’s processing of the fraud 
evidence cues that are more susceptible to attribution error.   
Psychology research suggests that placing a stereotype or label on a person, such as 
socioeconomic background, can impact all future judgments related to that person (e.g., Darley 
and Gross 1983). Darley and Gross (1983) provide that individuals could maintain a predisposed 
position when receiving future information by discounting inconsistent future information or 
reinterpreting the valence of new information to maintain the predisposed position. Thus, the 
predisposed like or dislike position leads to a global bias in the fraud judgment.  
Conversely, affect can impact assessments of individual fraud statements through 
attribution or errant attribution. That is, affect can influence certain types of related, but not 
relevant, evidence in future evaluations (Regan et al. 1974). As Hackenbrack (1992) proposes, 
individuals may use “similarity based inference” to link an irrelevant fact to an evaluation. 
Regan et al. (1974) find that likeability of a target impacts the future skill rating of the target 
person. Similarly, this research posits the auditors will link client likeability to the specific 
evidence being interpreted. That is, a personal characteristic of client likeability may be 
erroneously attributed to other characteristics or attitudes of the client, but it is less likely that 
errant attribution will occur to non-personal evidence, such as industry competitiveness.  
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 Auditors who are experienced with fraud presumably possess the task-specific knowledge 
to exclude client likeability in evidence assessments. Conversely, auditors who are not 
experienced with fraud may be more susceptible to making errant attributions. Thus, we posit 
that client likeability will be more likely to impact inexperienced auditors’ assessments of 
evidence cues through the errant attribution of client likeability. We also expect this errant 
attribution to be more prevalent in the evaluation of evidence cues that are related to the 
characteristics or attitudes of the client (management characteristics) than for other types of 
evidence cues. Formally stated: 
H4: Errant attributions of client likeability are more likely to occur for evidence cues 
concerning management characteristics than for evidence unrelated to management 
characteristics, and this effect will be mitigated for auditors with fraud risk 
assessment experience.  
 
METHOD 
Participants 
The participants in this study included 140 audit professionals from staff to partner from 
all of the Big 4 firms, another large international firm, and several regional firms located in two 
cities representing the mountain west and southeast geographic areas of the United States. The 
auditors were asked to voluntarily commit 30 minutes to complete a fraud likelihood judgment 
task in mini-case format.  
Procedure 
The quasi-experiment was a 2x2x2 between-subjects design with two levels of affect 
toward the client (like/dislike), two levels of accountability (low /high), and one measured 
variable, experience assessing financial reporting fraud risk (no experience/experience). The 
participants were asked to judge the likelihood of fraud for the company based on the 
information presented. 
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Partners of the contacted offices sent an email to audit professionals in their respective 
office containing a request to participate in the study. The email included the purpose of the 
study, the steps necessary to complete the study, the time commitment, and the voluntary nature 
of participation. The email also contained a link to the research website. In addition, each 
participant received a CD that contained the video portion of the study, which manipulated client 
likeability. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the experimental treatments of 
accountability as they entered the case materials on the website. After reviewing the case, the 
participants made an overall fraud judgment, completed their explanation requirement, 
performed a distracter task, and completed an assessment of ten potential red flag cues. An 
overview of the steps in the experiment is presented in Figure 1.   
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
 
Independent variables 
Participants first viewed the video of a hypothetical client, who participants were told had 
agreed to be taped for firm training purposes during the client acceptance interview. The client 
acceptance setting was chosen to minimize the potential for participants to consider prior year 
judgments made by firm colleagues. The client in both conditions expressed a desire to get the 
audit change completed. The company background, such as industry classification, was omitted 
to avoid a potential alternative explanation that auditors could systematically differ on the 
judgment of a particular industry’s inherent risk4.  
                                                 
4 Because the case intentionally omitted many factors of client acceptance procedures that could inform a fraud 
judgment, the introduction included the following statements, “You have been asked to assess the probability of 
fraud based on limited information about the company. The case you are provided purposely omits information 
related to client acceptance discussions of other members of the firm. You are being asked to consider the potential 
for fraudulent financial reporting based on a taped interview by a colleague with the client’s controller/CFO. The 
video was recorded during initial discussions of considering the engagement.”  
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The video contained two segments. The first segment included the introduction of the 
auditor to the client CFO, which contained the manipulation of client likeability.5 One group 
viewed a pleasant, considerate, and interested client (likeable) while the other group viewed an 
abrasive, rude/unpleasant, and inconsiderate client (dislikable). The second portion of the video 
(consistent for all participants) portrayed the client answering the auditor’s questions. This 
portion of the video contained the fraud cues (seven statements) adapted from Eining, Jones, and 
Loebbecke (1997), which represented a moderate risk of fraud for the client. The moderate risk 
case was selected to avoid floor or ceiling effects. The second segment was appended to each 
version of the first segment to create the two video versions, which were randomly distributed to 
the participants.  
Accountability was manipulated between subjects, with one group being informed that 
they would later be required to explain their fraud judgment and one group receiving no advance 
instructions regarding the explanation requirement. Fraud experience was measured with a 
dichotomous (yes/no) self-report of whether the auditor has ever been directly involved in 
judging the likelihood that a firm has fraudulent financial reporting.   
Dependent variable 
After viewing the video, participants provided their overall fraud judgment on an eleven-
point fraud judgment scale adapted from Hoffman and Patton (1997). The scale endpoints were 1 
(fraud extremely unlikely) and 11 (fraud extremely likely). Next, all participants provided an 
                                                 
5 The video was produced using a 50-year-old white male with management experience as the hypothetical 
client’s CFO. Because of potentially lengthy download time related to the video, the video was burned onto 
CDs for distribution to the participant pool. All other material, the introduction, overall judgment, 
individual cues, manipulation check questions, and demographic questions were placed on a research web 
site managed by the author. 
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explanation for their judgment (recall that only the accountable group was informed that this 
explanation would be required).  
Fraud Evidence Statements 
In an effort to provide information about the process by which affect influences fraud 
judgments, participants were given ten additional independent statements made by the 
hypothetical client. After recording their fraud judgment and completing a distractor task, 
participants were asked to assess each additional statement on an 11-point scale of whether it 
was (or was not) indicative of fraud. The statements were adapted from the 37 red-flag cue 
examples in SAS 82 and SAS 99.6 Cues from Loebbecke et al. (1989), Hoffman and Patton 
(1997) and Bell and Carcello (2000) were evaluated in developing the statements to present to 
participants.7  
Ten original red-flag fraud cues were selected and worded as a statement from the client 
in this case. The negative wording of each statement was then positively worded to create ten 
non red-flag statements. Each participant’s set of statements included five of the original red-flag 
statements and five non red-flag statements. Two versions of the ten statements were created 
such that the five red-flag (non red-flag) statements for half of the participants were the five non 
red-flag (red flag) statements for the other half of the participants. The statements are presented 
in Figure 2, and are categorized into statements relating to industry, management motivation, 
management attitudes, operations, or external auditor relationship (two cues from each category).  
<Insert Figure 2 here> 
                                                 
6 Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) 82 provides five categories including management characteristics (attitude 
and motivation), operating conditions, industry characteristics, and auditor relations (AICPA 1997). SAS 99 
provides three categories based on the fraud triangle (pressure, opportunity and rationalization) developed to identify 
characteristics of fraud perpetrators.  
7 We gratefully acknowledge Vicky Hoffman’s willingness to share her experimental materials and notes on fraud 
cues. 
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Pretest 
Several audit professors and several practicing auditors reviewed the materials. The 
practicing auditors were from a variety of firms and represented different levels of experience 
(staff, senior, and senior manager). The auditors unanimously agreed that the materials were of 
similar quality to firm training materials, and that the video accurately portrayed a likeable and 
dislikeable client similar to those they had encountered in practice. A pretest was conducted with 
students enrolled in an auditing class who had already covered the standard on fraud. The student 
participants completed the entire case for the non-accountable condition. The pretesting provided 
evidence that the likeability manipulation was salient, but not overwhelming. The mean rating 
for the dislikable client was 4.02 versus 5.52 for the dislikeable client on a scale from 1 (strong 
dislike) to 9 (strong like). The pretest also supported that the case represented a moderate risk of 
fraud, with participants rating the risk of fraud at a mean of 7.02 on a scale from 1 (fraud 
extremely unlikely) to 11 (fraud extremely likely). 
Because likeability is considered a central construct encompassing many psychological 
constructs (Brewer and Crano 1994), the pretest asked participants to rate the confederate CFO 
in the video on several personality characteristics. These included likeability (two questions), 
competence, honesty, and cooperativeness. Of the five questions, only the two likeability and the 
cooperativeness questions were significantly correlated to the assigned likeability condition. This 
provides evidence that, although the confederate CFO differed in likeability across conditions, he 
was not viewed differently in terms of honesty (means of 5.26 and 5.62 for dislike and like 
conditions, respectively) or competency (means of 4.74 and 4.62 for dislike and like conditions, 
respectively).  
RESULTS 
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Demographics 
The participants in this study were professional auditors from international and regional 
audit firms at levels from staff to partner.8 The participants’ fraud risk experience and rank 
demographics are presented in Table 1. Of the 140 auditor participants, 80 reported no 
experience, and 60 reported having experience assessing fraud in their professional duties. One 
person with 6.5 years of experience who reported experience with fraud judgments did not report 
his professional rank, and one staff level with no fraud judgment experience answered all 
questions except the overall fraud judgment question.  
<Insert Table 1 here> 
Manipulation Checks   
 To evaluate the experimental manipulation of affect, auditor participants were asked 
several questions related to the client in the video. Following the Regan et al. (1974) protocol, 
two questions asked the participant to rate the client’s likeability from dislike to like and whether 
the participant would like to work with the client. Both questions were scaled from 1 (strong 
dislike) to 9 (strong like). The means for the two questions for the dislikeable and likeable 
conditions were 3.44, 2.84, and 5.78, 5.50, respectively. Both manipulation check questions 
indicate a significant effect of affect for the hypothetical client in the video (F = 139.258, p < 
.001 and F = 137.198, p < .001 respectively). That is, when the hypothetical client appeared rude 
(pleasant), the participants rated his likeability lower (higher) and would not (would) like to 
work with the person in the video. Six participants’ perceptions were not consistent with the 
                                                 
8 Approval for the use of human subjects was granted from the IRB at the institution where the experiment took 
place. 
  19 
intended manipulation. That is, five (one) participants in the likeable (dislikeable) condition rated 
the CFO on the dislikable (likeable) end of the scale.9 
Overall Judgment 
 
After viewing the interview of the hypothetical client, participants made an overall initial 
fraud judgment. An eleven-point fraud likelihood scale adapted from Hoffman and Patton (1997) 
was used for the judgment. Recall that the case facts were intended to present a moderate risk of 
fraud. The mean rating for fraud risk for all subjects was 7.73 suggesting the case elicited a 
slightly higher than average risk of fraud.   
The auditors’ overall fraud judgment was analyzed using a full factorial ANOVA, and the 
results are presented in Table 2. The results indicate a three-way interaction between likeability, 
experience and accountability (F = 2.869, p = .047); a two-way interaction of likeability and 
experience (F = 4.183, p = .022); and a main effect of client likeability (F = 17.294, p < .001). 
All p-values are one-tailed. To further explore the three-way interaction, specific simple main 
effects were analyzed. These results along with the mean fraud judgment by condition are 
reported in Table 3. The accountability manipulation did not reduce likeability for inexperienced 
participants. These participants rated the fraud likelihood judgment higher (lower) for the 
dislikeable (likeable) client in both the low-accountable and high-accountable conditions (t = 
3.049, p < .01 and t = 3.377, p < .01 respectively). For the experienced auditors, accountability 
mitigated the effect of likeability (low-accountable: t = 1.817, p = .040; high-accountable: t = -
0.012, p = .495), partially supporting H2. In summary, the main effect results support hypothesis 
one that client likeability does influence fraud judgments. However, it appears that task 
                                                 
9 The results are presented using all participants based on assigned likeability condition. An analysis without the six 
participants results in a pattern of results that is consistent with the analysis presented in Table 3.  
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experience alone is not sufficient to moderate its effects. Accountability in combination with task 
experience eliminates the bias in judgment caused by client likeability.10 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
<Insert Table 3 here> 
In the dislike (like) condition, the video included a statement by the client expressing 
displeasure (pleasure) about the audit process. It is possible that this statement may have 
influenced participants’ perceptions of management’s attitudes about internal controls or may 
convey poor source reliability (i.e. signal that management may be trying to conceal a fraud). 
This would be a relevant fraud risk factor as discussed under rationalization in SAS 99. SAS 99 
describes rationalization as an “attitude, character, or set of ethical values that allows 
management to knowingly and intentionally commit a dishonest act” (AU 316.07). The pretest 
ratings of the case client on the characteristics of honesty and competency were not different 
between the affect conditions, which provides evidence that the manipulation did not impact 
participants’ perceptions of management as it relates to relevant fraud factors. Further, when 
partners’ (all of whom had experience assessing fraud risk) judgments are examined 
independently, likeability has no influence on fraud judgments, suggesting that experts did not 
view the information in the dislike condition as relevant to the fraud assessment.11  
Fraud Statement Assessments 
In addition to examining whether client likeability impacts overall fraud judgments, we 
also examine whether and how client likeability influences participants’ assessments of 
                                                 
10 As indicated in Table 1, the most variability in fraud experience existed among the senior and manager levels. 
While the sample size is not large enough to examine the three-way interaction within this group, it should be noted 
that there is an overall main effect of likeability within this group (like mean = 7.67 vs. dislike mean 8.39, p=.045, 
two-tailed), indicating that general audit experience alone is not sufficient to eliminate the effect of likeability.  
 
11 Seven partners, all with fraud assessment experience, judged the fraud risk to be similar regardless of the 
likeability condition (like condition mean = 8.33 (n=3); dislike condition mean =8.0 (n=4)). This provides evidence 
that there were no additional relevant fraud risk cues in the dislike manipulation. 
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individual fraud evidence statements made by management. Recall that participants assessed ten 
independent statements made by management (see Figure 2), which included five red-flag and 
five non-red-flag statements. The shaded statements in Figure 2 comprise the ten statements used 
in the primary analysis discussed and presented below. The non-shaded statements comprise 
statement set version two, and produced similar results.12   
A statistical comparison of means was used to test likeability’s impact on the statement 
assessments for both the inexperienced and experienced auditors. For the inexperienced auditors, 
results indicate that five of the ten statements are impacted by client likeability. Statements 3, 4, 
5, 6, and 7 are statistically different for the likeable versus dislikeable client conditions.13 
Statements 3, 4, 5, and 6 all refer to management characteristics, while statement 7 relates to an 
operational characteristic. Conversely, for the experienced auditors there is no difference for nine 
of the ten statements.14 The dislike condition resulted in a higher fraud rating than the like 
condition (p = .065) for statement 8, a related party evidence cue. Table 4 presents the means for 
the statement assessments across likeability condition and the corresponding t-test for the 
inexperienced auditors only. The results provide support for Hypothesis 4. That is, client 
likeability influences the assessments of evidence cues related to management characteristics for 
inexperienced (but not experienced) auditors. Inexperienced auditors rate statements that 
represent management characteristics as more indicative of fraud for the dislikeable client than 
the likeable client. This provides evidence that, for inexperienced auditors, likeability impacts 
overall fraud judgments partially through its impact on the assessment of statements made by 
                                                 
12 Because the negatively worded red-flag statement may not be completely parallel to its positively worded non-red 
flag statement counterpart, the statement sets were analyzed separately. The primary analysis (version one) includes 
45 inexperienced and 27 experienced auditors.  
13 For version 2 (where red-flag and non-red flag statements were reversed), statement 5 was not significantly 
different between conditions, and two statements were significantly different at p < .10. 
14 For version 2, there is no significant effect of likeability on any of the ten statements. 
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management. Since these ten statements were independent of (and assessed after) the fraud 
judgment, we are not able to test for a mediating effect, but inexperienced auditors do appear to 
exhibit attribution error of client likeability to evidence cues related to management 
characteristics. 
<Insert Table 4> 
Of the five statements assessed by the inexperienced auditors differently for the likeable 
versus dislikeable client, two statements were red-flag statements (statements 4 and 5), and three 
were non-red-flag statements (statements 3, 6, and 7). Together, the results generally support the 
prediction that client likeability impacts the statements referring to management characteristics, 
regardless of whether or not the statement was a “red-flag” statement. Figure 3 presents a 
graphical representation of the fraud evidence assessments between likeability conditions for 
experienced and inexperienced auditors.  
<Insert Figure 3> 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
As Bazerman et al. (2002) state: “We will need to embrace practices and regulations that 
recognize the existence of bias and moderate its ill effects.” Affect is one area of bias where 
there is still much to learn (Nelson and Tan 2005; Bhattacharjee and Moreno 2013). This 
research provides evidence that affect influences overall fraud judgments, and that this effect 
persists for auditors who are inexperienced with fraud judgments even when they are held 
accountable. One explanation for this result is that experienced auditors who anticipate having to 
explain their judgment have the requisite knowledge to enable systematic processing (system 2 
thinking), which leads to the use of only relevant evidence in their judgments. These findings 
support the profession’s use of accountability tools (requiring documentation/justification) to 
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encourage effortful thought, but highlight the need for task-specific knowledge in fraud 
judgments. The professional standards encourage brainstorming and group discussions in 
discussions of fraud, which can provide a venue for experiential training for inexperienced 
auditors to learn to distinguish relevant from irrelevant information in their judgment process. 
 This paper provides a first step to identifying the boundary conditions of the combination 
of experience and accountability’s impact. Our paper supports the suggestion by Hammersley 
(2011) that since fraud experience is highly varied among auditors, task experience is potentially 
gained through firm training or fraud-related tasks, such as risk assessments. Future research 
could investigate a larger set of mid-level experienced participants (i.e. seniors/managers) and 
various training and practice factors that can improve fraud risk judgments to provide further 
evidence.  
This paper also provides insights into how affect toward the client biases the processing 
of fraud cues for inexperienced auditors differently than experienced auditors. The results 
demonstrate that the inclusion of client likeability may not transcend all evidence evaluation. 
Client likeability impacts evidence statements that represent management characteristics, but it 
does not influence the assessment of fraud cues related to industry characteristics, related party 
transactions, or even past auditor relationships. This supports the notion that client likeability, 
which is irrelevant in fraud judgments, is errantly attributed to certain cues that are relevant to a 
fraud judgment. If the experiment had manipulated management’s honesty or integrity, it would 
have been appropriate for participants to differentially assess fraud cues related to management. 
However, the manipulation checks show that honesty, integrity, and competence were held 
constant across likeability conditions. This result is particularly important given that 
inexperienced auditor have significant interactions with audit clients. Bennett and Hatfield 
  24 
(2013) find that 86 percent of staff level auditors report interacting with client management three 
or more days during a typical week of fieldwork, and senior and staff-level auditors reported 
interacting with the client more than managers or partners. Further, prior research shows that 
documentation by lower level staff has the potential to reduce the effectiveness of the subsequent 
judgments of reviewers (Libby and Trotman 1993; Anderson and Koonce 1998; Agoglia, Brazel, 
Hatfield 2009). 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
As with all experimental research, this paper may not generalize to other audit judgments, 
such as internal control effectiveness and going concern judgments. It only addresses a fraud 
judgment within a client acceptance procedure for a client with a moderate fraud risk. The 
experimental design provided for the randomization of accountability and affect between 
participants. However, experience with fraud was a measured variable. Thus, it is possible that 
experience is correlated with an unmeasured variable (i.e. client size, industry). Specific details 
about the client (i.e. industry) were intentionally not provided to mitigate these concerns. 
Because this is an experimental setting, it is possible that other factors present in the audit 
environment were omitted in the study that could impact the results. However, care was taken to 
ensure the experimental materials represented the true audit environment, and discussions with 
practicing auditors indicate that the scenario was realistic. 
The results of this paper highlight the need for future research to investigate the impact of 
client environmental factors to other areas of auditor judgment and for varying fraud risk clients. 
Further, more research is needed on the types of evidence most likely to be impacted by client 
characteristics, the importance of relevant versus irrelevant affect in judgment, and the 
investigation of mechanisms and tools to improve auditor judgment. While this paper utilized 
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example fraud cues from the professional standards, future research should investigate if 
evidence can be better categorized to identify the specific characteristics of evidence that are 
influenced by client likeability (i.e. objective versus subjective), to further refine when 
inexperienced auditors might use errant attribution in their judgment process.  
This paper characterizes client likeability as an irrelevant factor for the fraud judgment. 
Bamber et al. (1997) find that auditors develop an “attitude toward the evidence” in the audit 
process (Bamber et al. 1997); thus, emotion toward some evidence is appropriate. In gathering 
evidence and formulating a fraud judgment, auditors must learn to appropriately utilize emotion 
to accurately select and weight evidence in their judgment process. Future research could further 
investigate how expert fraud examiners differentiate relevant and irrelevant emotion to assist the 
training of inexperienced auditors. Other methods for improving inexperienced auditor judgment 
include experiential training and electronic aids. Providing inexperienced auditors the knowledge 
possessed by experienced auditors could improve their judgment (e.g., Carpenter, Durtschi, and 
Gaynor 2006). Training material development would benefit from an examination of factors that 
both should and should not be included (cue selection) in the judgment beyond guidance that is 
provided by the current auditing standards. Electronic aids used as training tools and might also 
improve the information used and weight allocated to auditor judgments, such as decision 
support systems and expert systems (Eining et al. 1997, Bell and Carcello 2000). Future research 
could investigate how affect impacts interactions in brainstorming sessions within the team. 
Further, the effects of general affect (i.e. engagement team anxiety/stress from looming or prior 
PCAOB inspections) versus targeted affect (i.e. affect toward the client) should be examined.  
Finally, while the current paper examines the influence of the auditor’s affect toward the 
client, it may be fruitful for future research to examine whether management’s affect toward the 
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auditor is a relevant fraud signal that indicates an attempt to conceal fraud from the auditor. In 
our case, the dislikeable client expressed displeasure with the audit process, but we find no 
evidence that this was viewed as a relevant fraud cue. However, it is possible that a direct 
manipulation of client affect toward the auditor might be a relevant fraud cue. We know of no 
research that has examined this link. There are several anecdotal cases of clients with noteworthy 
personalities (i.e. Jeff Skilling at Enron), which may influence how auditors assess fraud risk. 
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FIGURE 1 
Participant Steps in Experiment 
1. Receive email from office partner requesting participation and CD (video) in office mail 
folder 
2. Open link to the research website and read an introduction to the study that includes the 
purpose and a modified consent form.   
3. Review hypothetical company and fraud likelihood scale example with explanation of 
midpoint being average client for the audit firm.  
4. Receive accountability treatment manipulation 
5. Watch video of an interview with the client containing affect (likeability) manipulation 
6. Make an overall likelihood judgment of fraud  
7. Document reasons for their judgment  
8. Complete distracter task: remove the CD and record the CD key number (to identify 
likeable/dislikable group membership) 
9. Make an assessment of ten additional CFO statements related to fraud likelihood. 
10. Complete a demographic survey and manipulation check questions 
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FIGURE 2  
Independent Fraud Statements 
 “Red-Flag” “Non- Red-Flag” 
Industry Conditions  
1 
As you know, our industry is very 
competitive with fairly saturated product 
markets. It’s so tough that we haven’t been 
able to maintain our profit margins over the 
last few years. 
As you know, our industry is not very 
competitive; our product markets are far from 
saturated. We’ve had no trouble maintaining our 
profit margins over the last few years. 
2 
The industry is changing so fast, 
particularly product technology. We’ve had 
to handle a great deal of product 
obsolescence. 
The industry doesn’t change very fast, 
particularly product technology. We haven’t had 
to deal with much product obsolescence. 
Management Motivation (Pressures) 
3 
Our new executive team tries to maintain 
our share price with some fairly aggressive 
accounting practices. 
Our new executive team manages to maintain 
our share price without resorting to aggressive 
accounting practices. 
4 
Our new executive team gives analysts what 
appear to be very optimistic forecasts. 
Our new executive team gives analysts what 
appear to be very achievable forecasts. 
Management Attitudes 
5 
Because of budget constraints we continue 
to struggle with the effectiveness of our IT 
system as well as our internal audit staff. 
Since we don’t have tight budget constraints we 
are quite happy with the effectiveness of our IT 
system and our internal audit staff. 
6 
In my view, the new executive team has not 
communicated its vision in terms of values 
and ethics very effectively. 
In my view, the new executive team has 
communicated its vision in terms of values and 
ethics very effectively. 
Operating Conditions 
7 
We have barely managed to generate cash 
flows from operations, while reporting 
earnings growth. 
We have easily managed to generate cash flows 
from operations, while reporting earnings 
growth. 
8 
The significant related-party transactions we 
have are not in the ordinary course of 
business. 
We have not had any significant related-party 
transactions in the ordinary course of business. 
  External Auditor Relationship 
9 
I must admit that we did have some disputes 
with our previous auditor. 
I’m happy to say that we did not have any 
disputes with our previous auditor. 
10 
I don’t think that our previous auditor 
understood our need for a quick audit and 
issuance of their report. 
I think that our previous auditor understood that 
we didn’t need a quick audit and issuance of 
their report. 
NOTE: Participants viewed five red-flag and five non red-flag statements after their fraud judgment was recorded. 
Two versions were created such that the five red-flag (non red-flag) statements for half of the participants were the 
five non red-flag (red flag) statements for the other half of the participants. Shaded statements indicate the ten 
statements used in version 1. The non-shaded statements were used in version 2. 
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FIGURE 3 
Panel A 
No Experience with Fraud Judgment 
 
Statements 3, 4, 5, and 6 refer to management 
characteristics (see Figure 2, version one), and each 
assessment is significantly different based on the client 
likeability condition (all p < .05). Statements 3 and 6 are 
non-red-flag statements, and statements 4 and 5 are red-
flag statements. For version 2, there is no significant 
difference for statement 5. All p-values are one-tailed. 
 
For the non-management statements (1, 2, 7, 8, 9 and 
10) five of the six assessments are not statistically 
different based on the client likeability condition. 
Statement 7 is an “operating” cue, and fraud is rated 
statistically higher for a dislikeable client than a likeable 
client. Statements 2, 7, and 10 are non-red-flag 
statements, and statements 8 and 9 are red-flag 
statements. 
 
 
Panel B 
Experience with Fraud Judgment 
 
 
For auditors with fraud judgment experience, there is no difference in the assessment of nine of the ten individual 
statements based on client likeability in version 1. Likeability influenced the assessment of Statement 8, a related 
party evidence cue (p = .065). There is no significant difference for any statement for the experienced auditors for 
version 2 of the statements. 
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TABLE 1 
Participant Task Experience by Professional Rank 
Experience a Staff Senior Manager 
Senior 
Manager 
Partner Total 
No 55 19 4 1 0 79 
Yes 8 22 8 14 7 59 
 63 41 12 15 7 138 b 
a Self-reported experience of the auditor’s direct experience assessing the likelihood of fraud for an 
audit client. 
b 
One participant with 6.5 years of experience (with fraud experience) did not provide professional 
rank. 
 
 
 
  
  36 
 
TABLE 2 
Univariate ANOVA of auditor’s overall judgment a 
Source of variance DF Mean Square F-value Sig.b 
Likeable (Like) c  -H1 1 32.959 17.294 .000 
Accountability (Acct) d  1 .148 .078 .391 
Experience e 1 2.236 1.173 .141 
Acct * Like  -H2 1 .369 .193 .331 
Experience * Like –H3 1 7.971 4.183 .022 
Acct * Experience 1 2.580 1.354 .124 
Like*Acct*Experience 1 5.468 2.869 .047 
Error 131 1.906   
 
a The overall judgment is measured on an eleven-point fraud judgment scale adapted from Hoffman and Patton 
(1997). Eleven indicates a high likelihood of fraud, and one indicates a low likelihood of fraud. 
b
 All statistical test significance values are one-tailed.  
c Client likeability (Like) is manipulated through a video recording of the auditor-client introduction, with the 
client represented as likeable or not likeable. 
d Accountability is manipulated through a forewarning of a required post-judgment explanation (high accountable) 
or by omitting this instruction (low accountable). 
e Experience is a self-report measure of the auditor’s experience with making a fraud risk judgment in their 
professional duties. 
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TABLE 3 
Fraud Judgment by Experience, Accountability and Likeability 
Fraud Judgment a 
Std. Dev. 
n 
  
 
Client Likeability b 
   
Experience c Accountability d Like Dislike Difference t-value Sig. e 
Inexperienced 
Low 
7.16 
1.50 
19 
8.33 
0.80 
21 
1.17 
 
 
3.049 
 
 
003* 
 
 
High 
6.65 
1.95 
20 
8.42 
1.22 
19 
1.77 
 
 
3.377 
 
 
.001* 
 
 
Experienced 
Low 
7.22 
1.48 
18 
8.23 
1.59 
13 
1.01 
 
 
1.817 
 
 
.040* 
 
 
High 
8.07 
0.92 
14 
8.07 
1.16 
15 
0.00 -0.012 .495 
a The overall fraud judgment is measured on an eleven-point scale adapted from Hoffman and Patton (1997). 
Eleven indicates a high likelihood of fraud, and one indicates a low likelihood of fraud. 
b Client likeability is manipulated through a video recording of the auditor-client introduction, with the client 
represented as likeable (Like) or not likeable (Dislike). 
c Experience is a self-report measure of the auditor’s experience with making a fraud risk judgment in their 
professional duties.  
d Accountability is manipulated through a forewarning of a required post-judgment explanation (high accountable) 
or by omitting this instruction (low accountable). 
e
 All statistical test significance values are one-tailed. The “*” indicates a statistically significant difference 
between groups in the predicted direction. 
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TABLE 4 
Fraud Statement Assessments for Inexperienced Auditors a 
Statement b Client likeability N Mean t Significance  
1c 
Dislike 19 8.47 
0.218 p = .829 
 
Like 26 8.38 
2 
Dislike 19 5.05 
0.954 p = .345 
 
Like 26 4.62 
3 
Dislike 19 7.74 
3.287 p = .002 d 
Like 26 5.65 
4c 
Dislike 19 8.89 
3.331 p = .002 d 
Like 26 7.42 
5c 
Dislike 19 8.58 
2.403 p = .021 d 
Like 26 7.50 
6 
Dislike 19 5.00 
2.465 p = .018 d 
Like 26 3.73 
7 
Dislike 19 6.53 
1.993 p = .053 
 
Like 26 5.27 
8c 
Dislike 19 8.11 
-1.063 p = .294 
 
Like 26 8.65 
9c 
Dislike 19 8.68 
0.353 p = .726 
 
Like 26 8.54 
10 
Dislike 19 5.89 
-.062 p = .951 
 
Like 26 5.92 
a 
Results represent the fraud assessments of inexperienced auditors who received version one (See 
Figure 2) of the evidence cues. Version two produced similar results. 
b 
Statements 1-10 represent five red-flag and five non-red-flag statements. Each statement matches 
the respective shaded statements (version 1) in Figure 2. Participants rated each statement on a 
scale from one (fraud less likely) to 11 (fraud more likely). 
 
c 
Represent red-flag statements, all other statements are non-red-flag statements. 
d Statements refer to management characteristics (motivation or attitudes).  
 
 
